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POLICE AND MINISTER OF POLICE v MBOWENI 
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1 Introduction 
The progressive nature of the South African Bill of Rights as enshrined in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter "the Constitution" and 
"the Bill" respectively) propelled the country into the position of being a world leader 
in the sphere of fundamental rights. The Bill is hailed as a guiding light for legal 
development even in established human rights law dispensations. However, such a 
radical change as that which has taken place in South Africa inevitably leads to legal 
uncertainty.1 In the field of family and child law this has become evident not only 
with regard to aspects of the status of individuals wishing to enter marriage,2 but 
also in the field of matrimonial property law, where marriage in community of 
property, on the basis of unfair discrimination, has been treated in in a fashion 
similar to marriage out of community of property and vice versa.3 
                                        
 JA Robinson. B Iur LLB (PU for CHE) LLM (NWU) LLD (PU for CHE). Professor in the Faculty of 
Law, North-West University (Potchefstroom). Email: robbie.robinson@nwu.ac.za. 
  R Prinsloo. B Proc (PU for CHE) LLM (NWU). Lecturer Vaal University of Technology 
(Vanderbijlpark). Email: ronelle.prinsloo@gmail.com. 
1 Robinson 2013 THRHR 409. 
2 Smith and Robinson 2010 PER/PELJ 30; Smith and Robinson 2008 BYU J Pub L 419-420. 
3 See eg Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund 2006 4 SA 230 (CC); Badenhorst v Badenhorst 
2006 2 SA 255 (SCA); Buttner v Buttner 2006 3 SA 23 (SCA). In Van der Merwe the Court found 
that s 18(b) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 drastically altered the common law 
position of marriage in community of property by permitting an injured spouse to recover 
damages for bodily injuries attributable to the fault of the other. However, it further found that 
there was no rational divide between patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages for the purposes 
of spousal claims against each other for delictual personal injury. The section consequently drew 
an impermissible differentiation between spouses married in and out of community of property in 
respect of the right to recover patrimonial damages suffered from bodily injury attributable to 
the fault of the other spouse (Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund 2006 4 SA 230 (CC) para 58) 
(see eg Robinson 2007 PER/PELJ 70-88; Mubangizi and Mubangizi 2005 Dev South Afr 278. In 
Buttner the parties were married to each other out of community of property and the accrual 
system did not apply. In respect of a claim in terms of s 7(3) the Court held "[f]airness demands 
that that effect be given, on divorce, to the principle of equal sharing which the parties 
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A further, though short-lived, development has recently occurred in the judgment of 
M v Minister of Police4 where the Gauteng North High Court substantially expounded 
the claim for damages for loss of parental care. It found that a child's claim following 
the wrongful death of his or her parent is not limited to the common law claim for 
loss of support but indeed extends to claims for constitutional damages since the 
notion of the right to parental care is entrenched in section 28(1)(b) of the 
Constitution.5 This extension of the claim of children was emphatically rejected by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Police v Mboweni.6 
This contribution reflects on the reasoning of the two courts and the relevance of 
the same for the debate regarding the care of children in terms of section 28(1)(b) 
of the Constitution and section 1 of the Children's Act 38 of 20057 (hereafter "the 
Children's Act"). Furthermore, brief reference will be made to the best interest of the 
child as reflected in section 28(2) of the Constitution. While prima facie it would 
appear to be a primary concern, neither of the decisions refers to this right of 
children. 
2 M v Minister of Police (a quo) 
2.1 The question 
In the a quo judgment in M v Minister of Police8 (hereafter "M") a radical new 
approach was followed in respect of claims for the loss of parental care. The issue 
before the court was whether or not a child whose parent had died as a result of the 
wrongful conduct of the South African Police Services might sue for damages arising 
from the child's constitutional right to parental care in terms of section 28(1)(b).9 Put 
somewhat differently, the question was whether a claim for damages may be 
                                                                                                                          
consciously applied throughout their married life" (Buttner v Buttner 2006 3 SA 23 (SCA) para 
25) (emphasis added). 
4 M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP). 
5 M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP) para 43. 
6 Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA). 
7 Hereinafter "the Children's Act". 
8 M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP). 
9 M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP) paras 43, 44. 
JA ROBINSON & R PRINSLOO    PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
1672 
 
instituted on the grounds that children are, as a result of the wrongful death of their 
father, deprived of their constitutionally entrenched right to parental care. No such 
claim exists in common law. 
2.2 The judgment - compensation for loss of parental care 
Section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution provides as follows: 
(1) Every child has the right – 
(a) … 
(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed 
from the family environment; … 
Section 1 of the Children's Act elaborates on the concept of care by providing as 
follows: 
"care", in relation to a child, includes, where appropriate -  
(a) within available means, providing the child with – 
(i) a suitable place to live; 
(ii) living conditions that are conducive to the child's health, well-being and 
development; and 
(iii) the necessary financial support; 
(b) safeguarding and promoting the well-being of the child; 
(c) protecting the child from maltreatment, abuse, neglect, degradation, 
discrimination, exploitation and other physical, emotional or moral harm or 
hazards; 
(d) respecting, protecting, promoting and securing the fulfillment of, and 
guarding against any infringement of, the child's right set out in the Bill of 
Rights and the principles set out in Chapter 2 of this Act; 
(e) guiding, directing and securing the child's education and upbringing, 
including religious and cultural education and upbringing, in a manner 
appropriate to the child's age, maturity and stage of development; 
(f) guiding, advising and assisting the child in decisions to be taken by the child 
in a manner appropriate to the child's age, maturity and stage of 
development; 
(g) guiding the behaviour of the child in a humane manner; 
(h) maintaining a sound relationship with the child; 
(i) accommodating any special needs the child may have; and 
(j) generally, ensuring the best interests of the child is the paramount concern 
in all matters concerning the child. 
As the point of departure in the interpretation of the Constitution and the Children's 
Act, the Court explained that the duty of a parent to maintain his or her child no 
JA ROBINSON & R PRINSLOO    PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
1673 
 
longer arises from common law but is now governed by the Children's Act.10 The 
Court approvingly referred to Heystek v Heystek,11 where the new position was 
explained as follows: 
The Constitutional notion of parental care and the paramountcy of the best interest 
of the child require an attitudinal shift from an antiquated Germanic parent and 
child relationship, which formed the substratum of the common law, to the rights of 
the child, which includes parental care and family care. Common law needs to be 
aligned to serve the constitutional imperatives of the child in a heterogeneous 
society. 
The Court in M found that the concept of loss of support had to be developed within 
the context of the rights of the child enshrined in the Constitution and the Children's 
Act.12 In its common law context the concept is applied restrictively and relates only 
to what is currently contained in section 1(a) of the Children's Act; it relates almost 
exclusively to the extent of the contribution to defraying day-to-day living expenses 
(nutrition, medical care and accommodation).13 The other aspects are "almost 
always not considered or included in the award for damages arising out of a child's 
loss of support".14 The Court concluded that child care is widely defined in the 
Constitution and the Children's Act and that payment for the loss of support at 
common law is only a part of the care envisaged in the Children's Act. The Court 
illuminated its argument as follows, in paragraph [22]: 
In my view ... the content of the right to parental care goes further than just the 
need for financial support. From the time of the birth of a child there are numerous 
duties which parents have to perform and where money is not a factor. These 
would include teaching the child to eat, to put on clothes, to tie shoes, to use 
ablution facilities, to walk, to talk, to respect, to express appreciation, to do 
homework and perform house chores, and to be present and supportive of the child 
during his/her participation in sport and art activities. The list is endless and no 
attempt is made here to create a numerus clausus. These parental care duties are 
performed to assist the child in preparing for life's challenges. They could be 
referred to as parental guidance, advice, assistance, responsibility, or simply 
parenting or child nurturing. 
                                        
10 M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP) para 43. 
11 Heystek v Heystek 2002 2 SA 754 (T) 757 E-G. 
12 M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP) para 43. 
13 M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP) para 44. 
14 M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP) para 21. 
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The right to parental care qua a constitutionally entrenched right consequently 
deserves constitutional protection and enforcement. Damages for the infringement 
of this right should be compensated by means of the constitutional remedy of 
appropriate relief. 
The Minister's contention that compensation for a child's loss of support included an 
award for loss of parental care was rejected by the Court on the basis that "[i]t is 
not one of those instances where the common law can be developed as stated in the 
Fosé case".15 The Court found support for its conclusion in section 15(2)(a) of the 
Children's Act. This section provides that a child who is affected by or involved in a 
matter to be adjudicated has the right to approach a competent court and allege 
that a right in terms of the Bill or the Children's Act has been infringed or 
threatened, upon which the Court may grant appropriate relief. However, the Court 
also found itself in agreement with Jooste v Botha16 that an action for damages 
arising out of section 8 of the Constitution will not be based on the child's 
deprivation of parental love and affection. This conclusion is based on the 
interpretation of the Children's Act, which does not make reference to a need to 
show love and affection to the child as one of the duties that a parent must 
perform.17 
                                        
15 Fosé v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC). In this case the defendent was sued 
for damages arising out of a series of assaults allegedly perpetrated by members of the SA Police 
Services. It was alleged that this conduct constituted an infringement of the fundamental rights 
of the plaintiff. An amount was also claimed under the heading "constitutional damages ... which 
includes an element of punitive damages". The defendent excepted to the claim on the grounds 
that an action for constitutional damages did not exist in law and that an order for the payment 
of such damages did not quailify as "appropriate relief" in terms of s7(4)(a) of the interim 
Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993). 
16 Jooste v Botha 2000 2 SA 199 (T). The court explained the position thus: "But not only in its 
relationship between a man and woman is marriage unique, so are the multiple relationships that 
flow from such union – mother father and child: and children mutually. There evolves a bond of 
kindship – blood is thicker than water - which society expects the parents, children and siblings 
to honour. But it does not grant rights to and impose concomitant obligations upon the parties 
except in the economic sphere." Jooste v Botha 2000 2 SA 199 (T) 206E-F. 
17 M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP) paras 22-23. 
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2.3 Some conclusions to be drawn from M 
The exposition above makes it clear that in the case of a child claiming for the loss 
of parental care there are three different categories of damages, being: 
- damages for which a child still does not have a claim as per the acceptance of 
Jooste v Botha; 
- damages as allowed at common law; and 
- constitutional damages qua appropriate relief. 
In paragraph 2.4 infra the appropriateness of constitutional damages under these 
circumstances will be discussed. 
2.4 A new category of damages - constitutional damages 
By way of introduction to the Court's explanation, reference should be made, albeit 
only briefly, to the concept of "appropriate relief" as set out by section 38 of the 
Constitution. It provides that anyone listed in the section (including children) has the 
right to approach a court alleging that a right in the Bill has been infringed, and that 
the Court may then grant appropriate relief. In Fosé v Minister of Safety and 
Security18 the Constitutional Court held that appropriate relief may include an award 
for damages where such an award may be necessary to enforce constitutionally 
entrenched rights. In Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd19 (hereafter Modderklip) and also MEC, Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate20 (hereafter Kate) the Supreme Court of Appeal 
confirmed the concept of constitutional damages. In Modderklip a claim for damages 
by a landowner was granted against the State after he had lost ownership of his 
land. This was due to its occupation by squatters and the impossibility of evicting 
them due to the State's failing to arrange for alternative land to accommodate them. 
In Kate it was found that the unreasonable delay in considering a person's disability 
                                        
18 Fosé v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC). 
19 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 6 SA 
40 (SCA). 
20 MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA). 
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grant resulted in the denial of such a person's right to social assistance, which 
constituted a breach of her constitutional right. Under these circumstances the Court 
found that an award for constitutional damages was the most appropriate remedy. 
It is clear not only that constitutional damages are recognised as part of South 
African law, but also that any party whose constitutional rights have been infringed 
may seek a remedy under the rubric "appropriate relief". In fact, in Fosé the Court 
held that, if necessary, courts may have to fashion new remedies to secure the 
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.21 However, it has always been 
made clear that awarding constitutional damages would be considered as an 
exceptional remedy, since the concept is fraught with difficulties. Currie and De Waal 
points out that constitutional remedies should be forward-looking, community-
orientated and structural.22 An award for damages in common law is typically not 
forward-looking but rather requires a court to look back to the past in order to 
determine how to compensate a victim or how to punish a violator. 
Furthermore, in Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape23 the 
Constitutional Court explained that the breach of a constitutional or statutory duty is 
not wrongful solely on the basis of delict. In addition it must be in the court's 
appreciation of the community's sense of justice reasonable to compensate the 
plaintiff, for instance where an administrative decision was taken in bad faith or 
under corrupt circumstances. However, despite these difficulties Currie and De Waal 
contend that there are at least two reasons why the development of such a remedy 
is necessary.24 In the first place there are certain circumstances where a declaration 
of invalidity or an interdict would make little sense so that an order for damages 
would then be the only form of relief to vindicate the particular fundamental right. 
Secondly, the possibility of a substantial award may encourage victims to litigate. In 
                                        
21 Fosé v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 19. 
22 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 200 et seq. 
23 Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 SA 121 (CC). 
24 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 200 et seq. 
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this sense the Constitution is vindicated and further infringements may be 
deterred.25 
Private law actions for damages aim to compensate a victim for harm caused to him 
or her by the wrongful conduct of another. An action for constitutional damages qua 
public law action has other objectives in addition to compensation. In particular 
circumstances it may be that delictual damages may be sufficient to vindicate a 
plaintiff's constitutional rights. In Fosé the Court was not persuaded that punitive 
damages would effectively deter the police from torturing suspects. It found that in 
a country where there is a great demand for scarce resources, it would be 
inappropriate to use them to pay punitive damages to a plaintiff who had already 
been compensated by way of delictual damages. The following principles emerged 
from the decision: 
- In a situation where the violation of a constitutional right entails the 
commission of a delict, an award for damages over and above those available 
under common law is not likely to be granted since it will amount to punitive 
damages. 
- Even where delictual damages are not available, constitutional damages will 
not necessarily be awarded for a violation of a person's fundamental rights. 
This much emerged from the Court's reserved attitude towards the granting 
of an award for constitutional damages. It found that a declaratory order 
combined with a suitable order for costs would be sufficient to vindicate the 
right if no other remedy was appropriate. 
Also, in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Von Abo26 it was held that a 
plaintiff would at least have to show that there was a causal connection between his 
or her loss and the breach of a constitutional right. 
The unqualified awarding of constitutional damages by the Court in M, despite the 
Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal repeatedly sounding a cautious 
                                        
25  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 201. 
26 Government of the RSA v Von Abo 2011 5 SA 262 (SCA). 
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note about this type of award, indicates a definite inclination to develop new 
remedies to compensate children. As such, it reflects a liberal view of the 
interpretation of a child's right to care as set out in the Children's Act and the 
Constitution. This unqualified award of an order for constitutional damages is 
problematic, as will be explained in paragraph 2.5 infra. Equally obvious is the 
Court's omitting to refer to the best interests of the children. This is remarkable in 
view of the fact that their care is directly related to their best interests. This aspect 
will be addressed in paragraph 3 infra. 
2.5 The Court's views of care in terms of the Constitution and the 
Children's Act 
In M the Court specifically focused its decision on parental care, which "[i]n general 
includes a show of love and affection by the parent to the child".27 The Court should 
therefore have distinguished parental care from the other forms of care referred to 
in section 28(1)(b). It failed to do so, unfortunately, and awarded constitutional 
damages without any such differentiation. It is suggested that this omission bears 
testimony to an impoverished view of the nature of the care exercised by the 
respective bearers of care set out in section 28(1)(b). 
While parental or family care is "exercised" in the family as an institution qualified by 
love,28 the same cannot be said of "appropriate alternative care", which will normally 
be provided by an organ of State. While it is trite that organs of State are bound to 
protect and further the best interests of children, the same does not hold true for 
parents and the family of a child. This distinction is of particular importance: should 
an alternative care-giver fail to provide the child with one or more of the aspects 
identified by the Court, the child surely would be able to approach a court on the 
basis of the State's non-compliance with its statutory obligation to treat the child's 
best interests as a paramount consideration. 
                                        
27 M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP) para 23. 
28 See Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk 1959 4 SA 658 (GW); Joshua v Joshua 1961 1 SA 455 (GW). 
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However, should the parent or family fail to provide care for the child as set out in 
the Act, different questions arise. This interpretation stems from the fact that each 
family- or parent-child relationship is unique. As a consequence it is not possible to 
frame generally applicable legal prescripts to apply to all families generally. It is 
suggested that the incidents set out in section 1(a) of the Children's Act, as 
elaborated by the Court, are qualified by love in the parent- or family-child 
relationship. On the other hand, organs of State are duty bound by statute to 
perform these tasks. The child's right to the incidents of care espoused in section 
1(a) and his or her best interests must be treated differently in the parent-child and 
state-child relationships respectively. This difference has a direct impact on the claim 
for damages for the infringement of the child's right to care. 
Reference may be made to German law to illustrate the difference between care by 
organs of State and parents. Contrary to parents, who are primary care-givers, 
alternative care is exercised by secondary care-givers. The role of the State 
consequently is of an accessory nature.29 In essence it is accepted that parents are 
the primary care-givers of their children and that the parent-child relationship is of a 
delicate and interwoven nature. It is the duty of the State to respect and protect it: 
[D]ie Eltern haben das Recht die Pflege und Erziehung ihrer Kinder nach ihren 
eigenen Vorstellungen frei zu gestalten, und geniessen insoweit ... Vorrang vor 
anderen Erziehungsträgern.30 
The delicate nature of the relationship would accordingly be disturbed if it were to 
be seen as a legal relationship characterized by reciprocal rights and duties or as one 
determined by statutory provisions, the primary remedy for infringement of which is 
of a legal nature. The accessory role of the State requires of it to provide measures 
and means to assist parents to fulfill their responsibilities towards their children. 
                                        
29 See Robinson 1992 SAPL 228 and the sources referred to. 
30 Bundesverfassungsgericht Entsheidung (24) 119 in 1968 Neu Juristen Woche 2333 at 2335. 
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Robinson31 explains the position thus: 
[d]aar nie 'n algemene reg vir die kind teenoor sy ouers bestaan waardeur hy hulle 
tot nakoming van hulle ouerlike reg ooreenkomstig die pligaard daarvan kan verplig 
nie, hoofsaaklik vanweë die feit dat die unieke, subjektiewe omstandighede in elke 
familie die toepassing van algemeen-geldende positiefregtelike voorskrifte 
ondoenlik maak. Die staat se verpligting om die grondregte van die kind te 
verwesenlik word egter geensins hierdeur beïnvloed nie. … Die ingrype deur die 
staat is eers toelaatbaar wanneer die ouerlike optrede binne die raamwerk van 
artikel 1666 BGB tuisgebring kan word, naamlik wanneer die skending van die 
ouerlike sorgverpligtinge tot ernstige gevaar vir die kind sal lei. Die skending van 
ouerlike sorgverpligtinge wat nie tot sodanige gevaar lei nie, bly sanksieloos. 
Individuele beskermingsmaatreëls vir die kind wat steurend op die familie inwerk 
terwyl die kind nie aan ernstige gevaar blootgestel word nie, sou in stryd met 
artikel 6(1) van die Grondwet wees, en sou ook nie die belange van die kind 
bevorder nie. Verpligtinge en optrede binne die familie en ook die persoonlike 
ontwikkeling van die familielede is eng met mekaar verweef, sodat optrede wat as 
growwe skending van een van hierdie aspekte aangemerk kan word, soms slegs 
aanduidend van 'n 'familiepatalogiese' sindroom kan wees. Die beste hulp vir die 
kind bestaan daarin dat die familie gehelp/ondersteun word om weer normaal te 
funksioneer en daar rus 'n verpligting op die staat om sodanige 
familieondersteunende maatreëls uit te put alvorens meer ingrypende maatreëls ter 
beskerming van die kind aangewend word. 'n Kind moet ook mindere 
inbreukmaking op sy individuele belange verduur aangesien die eenheid en 
integriteit van die familie eweneens belangrik is. Die algemene standpunt is daarom 
dat staatlike ingrype in sodanige geval meer skade as goed binne die 
familieverband sal doen. (emphasis added) 
From this brief exposition it emerges that: 
- the nature of the care provided by parents/family differs essentially from that 
of organs of State. Parental care constitutes the primary care of a child and is 
of a treuhand nature, whereas care provided by organs of State is accessory 
and is often determined by statutory prescripts; 
- parents are primary care-givers while the State's duty to care for children is 
merely of an accessory nature; and 
- the nature of the relationship determines whether the best interests of a child 
apply within the relationship – if parents were to be kept liable on issues of 
good or better ("Fragen von gut oder besser"), this would simply mean that 
the relationship would be disturbed, as children would then be in a position to 
                                        
31 Robinson 2013 THRHR 412. 
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enforce their own best interest against their parents, even in matters of lesser 
importance. It is suggested that it cannot be denied that the position of the 
parents determines the milieu within which the wellbeing of the child needs to 
be established. 
It is suggested that the Court should have reflected more closely on the question of 
the identity of the party which is bound to provide the child with care for the 
purposes of awarding constitutional damages. If it is accepted that the right of the 
child to institute legal action to claim damages against its parent or family is limited 
by the very nature of the relationship, it goes without saying that the possibility of 
claims for constitutional damages will also be limited. On the other hand, the 
position is different where the claim is against an organ of State as the provider of 
"alternative care". In this instance the claim for lack of care will be based on an 
infringement of statutory duties. In this instance the nature of the relationship will 
not pose any limitations on the claim, and the child's best interests will prevail. 
3 Minister of Police v Mboweni 
The decision in M was emphatically overturned in a unanimous judgment by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Police v Mboweni32 (hereafter Mboweni). 
Pointing out that upholding the a quo judgment would "break new ground" and 
would have "far-reaching ramifications",33 the Court first dealt with procedural 
issues. 
The appeal came before the Court on the basis of a special case/statement of facts 
"[a]s if there was a clear-cut issue of law capable of resolution with the barest 
minimum of factual matter being placed before the court".34 This was an error, the 
Court found. In fact in Fosé and Kate, the only two cases in which constitutional 
damages were awarded, the Courts had been appraised of the facts on which the 
claims were based. In casu, no facts dealing with the issue of the loss of parental 
                                        
32 Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA). 
33 Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA) para 4. 
34 Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA) para 5. 
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care were placed before the Court. In terms of Rule 33, which deals with statements 
of facts/special cases, the question of a remedy can arise only after the relevant 
right has been properly identified and the pleaded or admitted facts show that the 
right has been infringed. To start with the appropriateness of the remedy is to invert 
the inquiry, which is what had occurred in the a quo decision. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the statement of facts prepared by the 
parties did not comply with the requirements of the rules, in that it neither set out 
the facts that were to serve as the basis for the proposed legal argument, nor did it 
define the question of law the Court was being asked to determine.35 The Court 
emphasized that a special case must set out agreed facts, not assumptions. With 
regard to the claims of the two children, virtually no detail was provided save for a 
bold statement that the deceased had provided them with parental care. On that 
basis it was accepted by the parties that they were entitled to constitutional 
damages: they had been deprived of their biological father and therefore also of 
their constitutional right in terms of section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
The Court then proceeded to provide an exposition of the nature of the right of 
children in terms of the provision, as follows: 
The right is couched in the alternative, not as three separate and distinct rights. 
Children have a right to family care or parental care or appropriate alternative care. 
The third of these, which presupposes the absence of the first two, demonstrates 
that there are alternative ways of ensuring the fulfillment of the right generally 
embodied in the section. The right is thus a right that the child will be cared for, 
that can be fulfilled in different ways. That at least raises the possibility that the 
right is satisfied if any one of those alternatives exists as a matter of fact. ... The 
fact that section 28(1)(b) expresses the right that it embodies in three alternatives, 
demanded that in the first instance there be a proper analysis of the different 
elements of the right and, in particular, the relationship between the right to family 
care and the right to parental care. (italics added)36 
The proper approach to the three alternatives, the Court held, is to ensure that 
children are properly cared for by their parents or families and that they receive 
appropriate alternative care if such is lacking. It concluded therefore that at least 
                                        
35 Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA) para 6. 
36 Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA) paras 10, 11 (italics added). 
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superficially the child's rights to care, as guaranteed by the section, are fulfilled if he 
or she is cared for by any one of those identified or at least that one of those 
responsible for that care indeed provides it.37 
The Court proceeded to illustrate the importance of having a comprehensive 
exposition of the facts for the purposes of Rule 33 by posing rhetorical questions.38 
In the first instance, what would the position have been if the family unit had been 
disrupted by the death of a parent and the child was thereafter cared for by the 
surviving parent; and furthermore whether it could be said that there was no 
infringement of the child's right because it was being fulfilled in a different way. In 
addition, was the right partly infringed because there was an element of deprivation 
in the sense that both parents were not participating in the life of the child any 
more, but only one parent was now carrying the total burden of the care of the 
child? in connection with the second major issue, the Court posed the question what 
the position would be if the parents were separated and one parent provided the 
child's day-to-day care and the other parent died. Would that constitute a 
deprivation of parental care or had the separation of the father and the mother 
already done so? In casu the Court explained that it did not have a clear picture of 
the de facto relationship between the deceased and his two daughters (the 
plaintiffs).39 
A further issue addressed by the Court related to the question whether, even if the 
children had been deprived of the care of their father, a right to claim damages had 
been established.40 Did the police's failure to safeguard the deceased while in 
custody constitute a wrongful act in relation to the children? In order to answer this 
question, clarity had first be had as to whether the right operated horizontally in 
terms of section 8(2) of the Constitution so as to extend to the policemen in casu or, 
in case it did not, whether the position of state employees was different in view of 
section 8(1) of the Constitution. What was required was to establish whether the 
                                        
37 Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA) para 11. 
38 Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA) para 12. 
39 Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA) para 13. 
40 Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA) para 18. 
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police owed a legal duty to the children to prevent them from suffering the loss of 
parental care. Not every breach of a constitutional duty was equivalent to 
unlawfulness in the delictual sense, and not every breach of a constitutional 
obligation constituted unlawful conduct in relation to everyone affected by it.41 
The Court concluded that the answer must be in the negative.42 The police were in 
breach of the deceased's constitutional rights to human dignity, life and freedom, 
and security of the person, but this did not necessarily mean that they were under a 
legal duty to his children to secure their rights in terms of section 28(1)(b). 
Whether or not a legal duty to prevent loss occurring exists calls for a value 
judgment embracing all the relevant facts and involving what is reasonable and, in 
view of the court, consistent with the common convictions of society.43 
The court a quo did not undertake this enquiry. 
Even if it could be said that the police had a legal duty towards the children, the 
question remains whether constitutional damages were indeed the appropriate 
remedy for the breach. The Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out that the true 
question was whether the existing remedy for the loss of support was inadequate to 
compensate children for any breach of their right to parental care from their father. 
Referring to Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport,44 the Court 
explained that in an appropriate case a private law delictual remedy might serve to 
protect a constitutionally entrenched right. A claimant who seeks "appropriate relief" 
may, therefore, "properly resort to a common law remedy in order to vindicate a 
constitutional right".45 
                                        
41  Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA) para 19.  
42 Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA) para 19. 
43 Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA) para 19. Also see Steenkamp v Provincial 
Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 SA 121 (CC). 
44 Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC). 
45 Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC) para 21. Also see Dikoko 
v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC). 
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The Court pointed out that the court below had not considered whether a claim for 
damages for the loss of support was an appropriate remedy in this case. The court a 
qua should first have considered the adequacy of the existing remedy and only if it 
was found to be inadequate should it have considered whether the deficiency could 
be remedied. Such a remedy would be the development of the common law to 
accommodate a claim more extensive than one for pecuniary loss. In fact, the Court 
found that the infringement of constitutional rights may often be appropriately 
vindicated by resorting to public law remedies.46 
Against this background the Court referred to Fosé to consider the nature of losses 
that may be compensated,47 and found that it was a claim for pecuniary loss of the 
type ordinarily recoverable by way of the Aquilian action. It was not a claim for a 
solatium or for general damages. 
4 Some general comments and a conclusion 
It is suggested that the Court in Mboweni quite correctly indicated that the right to 
care, contained in s 28(1)(b), is couched in the alternative. However, it is a pity that 
the Court did not elaborate on the relevance of the identity of the bearer of the 
obligation to provide such care. 
As explained above, this issue will determine whether the child can enforce his/her 
rights, including his/her best interests, within the relationship, and consequently 
whether damages may be claimed for the infringement of such rights. If a child 
cannot claim such damages because he or she has to endure minor infringements 
thereof, the very nature of the relationship militates against the awarding of 
damages if an infringement of such rights has taken place. On the other hand, if the 
infringement is in contradiction of an organ of State's statutory duty, no such 
limitation exists, and a child would be able to claim damages for such an 
infringement. 
                                        
46 Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC) para 22. 
47 Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC) para 24. 
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Secondly and contrary to the a quo decision, the Supreme Court of Appeal made no 
reference to the provisions of the Children's Act regarding the care of a child. It 
focused solely on the care of a child as the concept enshrined in section 28(1) of the 
Bill of Rights. 
What the decisions of both Courts do have in common, though, is that neither of the 
courts refers to the constitutionally entrenched right, namely the best interests of a 
child. It is suggested that the approach of the courts indicates a sound 
understanding of the applicability of the concept and as such bears indirect fashion 
on the explanation regarding its interpretation in S v M48 and Minister of Welfare and 
Population Development v Fitzpatrick.49 
It is indeed true that section 28(2) has become a key provision in Bill of Rights 
jurisprudence in the sense that it has helped to develop the meaning of some other 
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. It has also been used to determine the ambit of 
and to limit other competing rights. However, section 28(2) is not merely a principle 
that helps the interpretation of other rights – it is a constitutionally entrenched right 
in itself.50 However, proper perspective must be had of the scope and function of 
section 28(2). It must be viewed against the background described by Sachs J in S v 
M,51 that no constitutional injunction can in and of itself isolate a child from the 
shocks and perils of harsh family and neighbourhood environments. The function of 
the law is to create conditions to protect children from abuse and to maximise the 
opportunities for them to lead happy and productive lives. The State can therefore 
not repair disrupted family life, but it can create positive conditions for such repair to 
take place. Where the rupture of the family becomes inevitable, the State is called 
upon to lessen the negative effects thereof on children as far as it can.52 It needs no 
further elaboration that this explanation essentially duplicates that of the position in 
Germany, as set out above. 
                                        
48 S v M 2008 3 SA 232 (CC). 
49 Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC). 
50 Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC) para 17; S v M 
2008 3 SA 232 (CC) para 22). 
51 S v M 2008 3 SA 232 (CC). 
52 S v M 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) para 20. 
JA ROBINSON & R PRINSLOO    PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
1687 
 
Against this background the approach of the Courts to avoid referring to section 
28(2) should be evaluated. It goes without saying that the best interests of the 
children in casu were indeed at stake when their breadwinner was killed. Reference 
to section 28(2) may easily have been made in view of the exposition in S v M53 that 
statutes must be interpreted and the common law developed in a manner which 
favours protecting and advancing the interests of children.54 After reflecting on the 
"very expansiveness" of the paramountcy of the best interests of children and the 
seemingly inherent weaknesses in the concept which "[c]reate the risk of appearing 
to promise everything in general while actually delivering little in particular",55 the 
Court set out to establish an operational thrust for the paramountcy principle. It 
concluded that the word "paramount" is emphatic. 
Coupled with the far-reaching phase "in every matter concerning the child", and 
taken literally, it would cover virtually all laws and all forms of public action, since 
very few measures would not have a direct or indirect impact on children, and 
thereby concern them ... This cannot mean that the direct or indirect impact of a 
measure or action on children must in all cases oust or override all other 
considerations. If the paramountcy principle is spread too thin it risks being 
transformed from an effective instrument of child protection into an empty 
rhetorical phrase of weak application, thereby defeating rather than promoting the 
objective of s 28(2).56 (emphasis added) 
The above explanation amply illustrates the appropriateness of both Courts' omission 
to refer to section 28(2). Even though of some relevance, the matter could clearly be 
dealt with sufficiently on a discussion of the nature of care in terms of section 
28(1)(c). It is suggested that the position in casu is a fine example where application 
of section 28(2) would have defeated rather than promoted the objectives of the 
section. 
Thirdly the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal illustrates the relevance of the 
distinction between parents as primary care-givers and the State as a secondary 
care-giver. The respective positions of parents and the State give rise to substantial 
differences in their respective relationships vis-á-vis the child. 
                                        
53 S v M 2008 3 SA 232 (CC). 
54 S v M 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) para 15. 
55 S v M 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) para 23. 
56 S v M 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) para 25. 
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